In this paper we investigate the ability of a number of different ordered probit models to predict ratings based on firm-specific data on business and financial risks. We investigate models which are based on momentum, drift and ageing, and compare them with alternatives which take the initial rating of the firm and its previous actual rating into account. Using data on US bond issuing firms, as rated by Fitch, over the years 2000 to 2007, we compare the performances of these models for predicting the ratings both in-sample and out-of-sample using root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano tests of forecast performance and contingency tables. We conclude that both initial and previous states have a substantial influence on rating prediction.
Introduction
It is well known that ratings agencies provide independent assessments of the risk of a counterparty using information on the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, and private information on the management of the entity, summarized using a rating scale which runs from the highest rating, AAA, to the lowest, CCC. The analysis of credit risk, the probability of default and ratings has a long pedigree (see Horrigan, 1966; Kao & Wu, 1990; Kaplan & Urwitz, 1979; Pinches & Mingo, 1973; Pogue & Soldofski, 1969) . This body of literature seeks to explain the relationship between ratings and financial or business risks, and has investigated applications to a wide range of sovereign countries, financial companies and corporations (Amato & Furfine, 2004; Blume, Lim, & MacKinlay, 1998; Rösch, 2005; van Gestel et al., 2007) . We expect the ratings to be closely related to the default risk of the country or company being rated, or the instrument being issued, although rating agencies themselves claim to rate 'through the cycle', and seek to avoid any correlation with the business * Corresponding author. E-mail address: serafeim.tsoukas@glasgow.ac.uk (S. Tsoukas).
cycle. It is clear that frequent changes in ratings are undesirable from the points of view of long-term investors, governments and firms, whose financing options and costs may be affected by ratings through regulation, covenant provisions on loans or bonds, and the reduction of access to money and derivatives markets (see Pagratis & Stringa, 2009 ).
The examination of ratings behavior over time performed by Blume et al. (1998) showed that credit ratings became worse, on average, with the increased volatility in corporate creditworthiness during the mid-1980s and early 1990s being accompanied by downward momentum in credit ratings. This extended the approach developed by Carty and Fons (1993) for measuring the ratings drift. Because firms which were initially rated as AA on the basis of their risk characteristics were subsequently rated lower than AA, Blume et al. (1998) and others concluded that the standards of ratings agencies became more stringent over this period. However, ratings can also deteriorate because firms have a lower credit quality, for example if they becoming more leveraged, and a subsequent study by Amato and Furfine (2004) identified no secular change in rating standards in data over the period 1984-2001. Instead, their results implied that the ratings changes were driven by changes to business and financial risks rather than cycle-related changes to rating standards. Cantor and Mann (2003) confirmed that rating reversals are rare, even at a five-year horizon. At the same time, the large number of rating downgrades during the US corporate credit meltdowns in 2001-02 and 2007-09 casts some doubt on the extent to which ratings really see through the cycle. There are also other dynamics at work in ratings. Carty and Fons (1993) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) found evidence that there is momentum in ratings, since a firm which has previously been upgraded has a different probability of upgrading in the next period to a firm which has previously been downgraded. Carty and Fons (1993) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) also found evidence of ageing in ratings, which occurs when the current rating is dependent on the period of time that the firm spent in the previous rating category. The debate over the determinants of ratings is ongoing, and this paper compares various alternative models for forecasting the current rating classes of a number of US bond issuing firms.
Despite the many competing arguments which seek to explain ratings, it is agreed that ratings do seem to show state dependence. This contravenes the assumptions of the simple stationary Markov chains which are often used to make predictions of ratings transitions, although more complex models involving mixtures of Markov chains or models with non-Markovian features such as drift, momentum and ageing can be more informative than simple Markov models. In this paper we examine the role of state dependence in predicting credit ratings by first estimating the determinants of credit ratings using linear measures of business and financial risks from the balance sheet. We then allow for the possibility that some variables influence the rating in a nonlinear manner, supplementing the linear model with nonlinear terms, following van Gestel et al. (2007) . We also introduce models of drift, momentum and ageing. Then we allow the model to register the initial rating of the firm and the previous actual rating of the firm, creating persistence through state dependence (initial and previous states). This marks a break with previous studies, which have used ordered probit or logit models without considering the influence of the previous rating history on the current rating. We show that there is a very considerable amount of evidence that allowing for state dependence in ratings improves the prediction of current ratings. Even by the standards of the earlier models, which evaluate the relative performances of alternative models in terms of an informal goodness-of-fit indicator, the performance of the model with state dependence in predicting the current rating is superior. When we examine the predictive ability both insample and out-of-sample using the root mean squared error with the Diebold and Mariano (1995) prediction test, and evaluate the proportion of correct predictions using Merton's correct prediction statistic (Merton, 1981) , we find that the state dependence model is better than the alternatives based on this measure as well. The alternative models which we consider include the momentum, drift and ageing hypotheses for predicting ratings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the extensive body of literature on credit risk, the probability of default and ratings; Section 3 describes the methodology which we use in this paper; Section 4 presents the data used in our empirical analysis; and Sections 5 and 6 report the results, model predictions and forecast evaluations. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature
The body of literature on credit risk and default prediction, of which the analysis of credit ratings forms a part, is vast. This literature review will provide the context for our analysis, while necessarily leaving many of the details for the reader to follow up using the references cited. We start with a discussion of credit risk and default probabilities, before considering the analysis of ratings, ratings transitions and the relationship between ratings and cycles.
Credit risk and the probability of default
If we suppose that the probability of default can be connected with the characteristics (covariates) of the firm recorded in the matrix X it , then one approach to analyzing the probability of default is the logit regression. Taking y i = 1 as the default outcome observed for firm i, the probability of default is defined as Pr
, where α and β are matrices of parameters to be estimated. The estimation can be undertaken using maximum likelihood methods, where the likelihood function is defined as Anderson (1984) shows that this approach is closely connected to discriminant analysis. It is assumed that we can observe both firms which survive (y i = 0) and those which default (y i = 1), and can see what their characteristics are in a training sample of data. If these groups have different means, µ 0 and µ 1 respectively, a common variance covariance matrix, Σ, and densities of φ 0 and φ 1 respectively, then the discriminant function d(X ) =
allocates firms to group 0 if d(X ) ≥ log K , and group 1 otherwise, based on their information from a second sample of data. This discriminant function ensures that the costs of allocating the firm to the 'wrong' group are minimized. Anderson (1984) shows that following this approach is equivalent to estimating a logit regression, where we restrict Pr( Duffie and Singleton (2003) and Lando (2004) point out that the Z -score derived by Altman (1968) is essentially a form of discriminant analysis, where the X it covariates are financial ratios from the firm's balance sheet recorded over time. An example of the use of discriminant analysis for assessing the default probability is given by Lo (1986) , who found that this method was as successful as a logit model in discriminating between bankrupt firms in a sample of US firms. Lennox (1999) found a similar result on a sample of 949 UK firms between 1987 and 1994, in which the covariates included firm-specific variables such as leverage and cash flow, as well as macroeconomic indicators such as the business cycle. Another way in which authors have considered the probability of default is by referring to the hazard function. If we consider the hazard as the probability of defaulting at time t, given that the firm has survived up to this time, then if we think of s as a default time which has a density function f (.) and a distribution function F (.), then the hazard function is h(t) = f (t) 1−F (t) . If the survival function has a logistic distribution then the hazard model would result in a logistic model of the probability of default. The most commonly used examples of hazard models, however, are proportional hazard models which often depend on firm covariates. Duffie and Singleton (2003) document the fact that a hazard function h(t) = h 0 (t)Γ (α + X it β) has two elements, representing the baseline hazard, h 0 (t), which is common to all firms, and an element Γ (α + X it β) that depends on the firms' characteristics, X it . The precise functional form of the baseline hazard can be either parametric or non-parametric (see for example Lando, 2004, pp. 84-87) . An example of this approach with reference to credit risk is given by Shumway (2001) , comparing the performance of duration models with the performances of static methods such as logit and probit models. Using covariates identical to those of Altman (1968) , he showed that a duration model outperformed the logit using the same information set. Chava and Jarrow (2001) later extended Shumway's model to include market data on capitalization, excess returns in the stock market and the volatility of stock market returns, and further improved on the performance of the Altman model. Duffie and Singleton (2003) argue that the main difference between qualitative response models, discriminant analysis, and duration models based on the hazard function, is their implied default-time densities conditioned on the same information set, X it . The duration models estimate the probability of default over time, while the other methods refer to the probability in a single period (or a succession of unconnected periods). Our own model makes use of the probit estimator using the information set X it , but allows for the influence of the initial state (rating) and the previous state in various ways.
Ratings and ratings transitions
When considering a discrete ratings system, it can be useful to make the assumption that ratings are characterized by Markov chains in modeling the ratings process, even if the histories reveal non-Markov chain properties, since the assumption provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the actual ratings history (see Lando, 2004, pp. 88-89) . If we use a discrete time Markov chain, then the estimation of the likelihood is similar to a multinominal logit estimator. The discrete model assumes that there are i = 1, 2, . . . , N firms in t = 1, 2, . . . , T time periods, such that n s (t) is the number of firms in state s and n s,s−1 (t) is the number of firms which transit from state s to state s − 1, and therefore N s (T ) = ∑ T t=0 n s (t) is the total number of firms recorded at the beginning of the transition period, and N s,s−1 (T ) = ∑ T t=0 n s,s−1 (t) is the total number of firm transitions from state s to state s − 1 observed in the entire time period. Assuming further that ratings transitions are independent across firms, and that the probability of observing a transition path from x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x T is p x 0 ,x 1 , p x 1 ,x 2 , . . . , p x , which is very similar to the multinomial logit estimate of the transition probability.
An alternative to the stationary Markov assumption is to assume that firms can be classified as either 'movers' or 'stayers', in line with the model of Frydman, Kallberg, and Kao (1985) . Instead of the Markov chain defining the probability of a transition from x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x T , there is a definition p x 0 ,x T = SI + (I − S)M T , where I is the identity matrix, M is the (K × K ) transition matrix and S = diag(σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ K ), with σ i defining the proportion of stayers in state i = s, s−1, . . . , K at time 0. Some firms will not leave their initial state; we denote these by n i (t). The term n i (0) refers to the number of firms initially in state i = s, s − 1, . . . , K at time 0. There are some firms which transit to other states m s,s−j , but some 'movers' end up back where they started, m s,s . As was shown by Frydman et al. (1985) and Lando (2004) , with a large enough sample, the proportion of movers that return to their initial state
, and the proportion of stayers in each state is σ i = N s (T ) n s (0) . This final term has the intuitive interpretation of being the total number of firms recorded as being in state s at the beginning of the transition period, divided by the number of firms initially in state s. Frydman et al. (1985) apply this method and the stationary Markov chain model to 200 revolving credit accounts over the period September 1978 to May 1981, and suggest that the mover-stayer model has the advantage of modeling some individual heterogeneity which improves the predictions compared to those of the Markov chain model.
It is entirely possible to construct ratings transition equations that depend on observed transitions as a proportion of the firms in each rating category; however, this assumes that the time periods are homogenous. Under this assumption, the transitions behavior that is observed can be used to create a generator, Λ, which will provide the probability that a firm in rating category s will be in rating category s − 1 at some time t, namely Π s,s−1 . If the default state is s = K , then Π s,K is the probability of default.
However, there is no reason to maintain the assumption of time homogeneity, and Kavvathas (2001) has allowed the generator to be a function of market data. One reason for rejecting time homogeneity is the observation that the probability of transition depends on the influence of the business cycle or the age of the bond.
Ratings and cycles
If ratings vary across the cycle or depend on the age of the bond, then the Markov chain assumptions break down (Lando, 2004, p. 97) . This introduces the issues of ageing, momentum and drift. If the rating transition depends on the period of time that the bond has been in a particular rating category, then it is subject to ageing, as documented by Carty and Fons (1993) , Kavvathas (2001) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) . These authors, together with Bangia, Diebold, and Schuermann (2002) and Behar and Nagpal (1999) , also note that the rating transition depends on the previous rating category, which suggests a momentum effect on ratings. Empirically, this has been found to be the case for downgrades more than for upgrades. A further analysis of ratings over time has addressed the question of ratings drift, which can be the result of either variations in the standards of ratings agencies in assigning ratings or variations in the credit quality of firms seeking ratings. The studies of Amato and Furfine (2004) , Blume et al. (1998) and Cantor and Mann (2003) all refer to this issue. We have noted that ratings agencies claim to 'rate through the cycle', but that the existence of ageing, momentum and drift in ratings require us to modify our Markov chain assumption and allow for state dependence in ratings through the inclusion of either the previous rating or the initial rating in an ordered probit model. Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000) introduced a business cycle state variable (peak, normal and trough) into the covariates driving the ratings transitions, depending on whether the GDP growth rate was in the upper end, mid range or lower end of the observed growth rates in the sample period. Allowing for these influences, they found that the transitions of US firms rated A or higher were not affected by the cycle, but that there was an influence of the cycle for lower rated firms (Baa and below).
Another way of modeling the cyclical effects of the economy on output, defaults and credit spreads was introduced by Koopman and Lucas (2005) . They model the business cycle and the measures of actual defaults of firms and credit spreads using an unobserved components model along the lines of Harvey (1989) , with a strong reliance on the time series dimension of the ratings data, in contrast to the cross-sectional properties discussed by Bangia et al. (2002) and Nickell et al. (2000) . The model uses real chained GDP growth and the default rates of US firms, and contains US business failure rates per 10,000 companies over the period 1927-1997, the credit spread based on Moody's yields on Baa corporate bonds and the yield on government bonds with a maturity exceeding 10 years. The cyclical and irregular components of the series are removed when the model is estimated using a Kalman filter. Focusing on the time series properties of their data, Koopman and Lucas (2005) found 'strong co-cyclicality' between spreads and defaults and between spreads and growth at business frequencies of 6 years, and when they examined longer frequencies of 11 years, there was also a significant correlation between growth and default cycles.
In a recent paper, Frydman and Schuermann (2008) tie Markov models, the mover-stayer model and the literature on the non-Markov properties of ratings together. As we mentioned above, the conventional time homogenous Markov model implies that all firms with the same rating will migrate from that rating at the same speed, but the non-Markovian features of ageing, momentum and drift detected in ratings do not follow this principle. However, if the model is modified to allow firms with the same ratings to migrate at different speeds, forming a mixture of two time homogenous Markov chains, for example, then these features can be accommodated in a model with Markov properties. Frydman and Schuermann (2008) consider a situation where there are two generators, Λ and G, Λ = Γ G and Γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , . . . , γ K ), where s = 1, . . . , K are the states or ratings classifications. A proportion π s of firms with rating s migrates according to the first Markov chain with generator Λ, and the remainder (1 − π s ) migrate according to the second Markov chain, with generator G. The Markov chains differ in the rate at which the firms leave state s, but each firm has the same probability of entering another state. It is also true that in the special case where γ s = 1 for all s = 1, . . . , K , the model collapses to a stationary Markov model (since Γ = (1, 1, 1, . . . , ) = I K ), and where γ s = 0 for all s = 1, . . . , K it becomes the mover-stayer model. Frydman and Schuermann (2008) consider the predictive ability of such a model, dependent on an information set t− , which includes information about the realizations of the mixture process. Under a standard time homogenous Markov assumption, the information set t− would not be relevant to predictions of either ratings or ratings transitions, but in this mixture model, the rating history, including the past ratings and the initial rating, as well as the period of time in a rating state, all matter. We use this observation to propose a number of alternative models which consider the initial rating, the lagged rating and the time within a rating state as explanatory variables for the ordered probit model we use below. We also include firmspecific variables to explain the rating state.
Methodology
In this section we explain how we use firm-specific characteristics to predict credit ratings. 1 First, we discuss the ordered probit analysis employed in the literature with linear and non-linear explanatory variables. Second, we note the state dependence in ratings and ensure that our model, which gives the probability that an issuer, will fall into a particular rating category, accounts for the information in the past history of ratings. Finally, we explain how the evaluation of ratings using tests of predictive performance can quantify the ability of our model to predict ratings using the information in the explanatory variables discussed above.
An ordered probit model of ratings
We begin our analysis with the standard academic framework for relating long-term default ratings to financial data on the balance sheet using a limited dependent variable model, as used by Amato and Furfine (2004) , 1 That is not to say that credit agencies use this method to generate ratings -for a detailed statement of the process used by agencies, see van Gestel et al. (2007, Figure 1 ) -but the academic literature has connected the ratings assigned by agencies with firm characteristics using these methods. Blume et al. (1998) , Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) , Pagratis and Stringa (2009) and van Gestel et al. (2007) , among others. Credit ratings can be viewed as resulting from a continuous, unobserved creditworthiness index, y * it . Each rating corresponds to a specific range of the creditworthiness index, with higher ratings corresponding to higher creditworthiness values; and therefore, credit ratings are discrete-valued indicators and have an ordinal ranking.
Following Maddala (1983) , we can state that the unobserved index of credit quality, y * it , is defined for the
This ordinal response can be modeled through an ordered probit model of the following type:
where X it denotes a set containing k explanatory variables for firm i and year t, β is a k × 1 vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and ϵ it is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. The model includes time dummies for each year to capture year effects, and industry dummies to control for the unique influence of factors affecting specific industrial groups. In our data, y * it is not observed, and thus we use the credit ratings assigned to firms, which can take M values for the observed variable, y it , that are assumed to be related to the latent variable y * it through the following observability criterion:
for a set of parameters α 0 to α M , where α 0 < α 1 < · · · < α M , α 0 = −∞ and α M = ∞. Assuming a standard normal distribution for ϵ it , the conditional probabilities can be derived as:
where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function.
We can evaluate the above probabilities for any combination of parameters in the vectors α and β. In our analysis we consider a pooled probit model which does not require strong exogeneity assumptions. Thus, the model defines the categorical variable y it = 1, 2, . . . , 7, which is the rating assigned to each firm, and without loss of generality we can record AAA as 1, AA as 2, A as 3, to CCC as 7. 2 It connects the characteristics of the firm recorded in the matrix X it to the rating of the firm through the estimated parameters, β, of the model, and the cutoff values, α 0 to α M .
The standard approach to modeling credit ratings is to take the variables in the matrix X it as a linear measure of the firm-specific characteristics, as we have represented the model above. However, recent work by van Gestel et al. (2007) has shown that non-linear transformations of the same firm-specific characteristics can allow for the fact that an x% change in a variable will not necessarily have a linear effect on the credit rating. We therefore take a nonlinear transformation of the variables in X it 2 In practice, we put AAA and AA together as one category, and B and CCC together as one category, due to the small number of observations in the highest and lowest classes. and apply the hyperbolic tangent transformation x → f (x) = tanh(x) to limit the impact of large negative or positive values of these ratios. These terms will be used to determine the effect of nonlinearities in the rating prediction function. We select the non-linear terms by determining whether we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on these terms are jointly zero, i.e., H 0 : β NL = 0 in a model of the form:
where f (X it ) is a matrix of variables transformed by the hyperbolic tangent transformation, and β NL is the vector of coefficients.
Other tests of momentum, ageing and drift are included by adding as regressors:
1. A dummy variable for firms which have previously had an upgrade and a dummy for firms which have previously had a downgrade. If momentum effects of the kind described by Carty and Fons (1993) are present in our sample, the former should be insignificant and the latter positive and significant. 2. Evidence of ageing, as measured by the number of periods in the previous rating state, following a change in the rating state. We expect this variable to have a negative and significant coefficient. 3. Evidence of drift, as measured by the coefficient estimates of the difference in the percentage of firms experiencing an upgrade minus the percentage of firms experiencing a downgrade for each calendar year.
An ordered probit model with state dependence
Several authors have noted that ratings do not respond immediately to current information; for example, Odders-White and Ready (2006) suggest that rating agencies can be slow in responding to new information. This may occur either for reasons which are inherent to the rating setting process within the credit ratings industry, or due to the rating through the cycle approach, which attempts to separate ratings from cyclical factors. However, when ratings are compared in successive time periods, there is evidence of serial correlation (see Carty & Fons, 1993; Gonzalez et al., 2004) , which may reflect a degree of temporal interdependence. Pagratis and Stringa (2009) show that bank ratings tend to be sticky, and therefore state dependence appears to be very important in predicting certain types of ratings. 3 As a result of these observations, we extend the model in order to take the persistent nature of the ratings into account. The more general specification that we estimate is derived from Greene and Hemsher (2008) and Wooldridge (2005) , and includes previous rating states in our ordered probit framework in order to capture state dependence. It can be written as:
where X it is a 1 × k vector containing k explanatory variables and β is a k × 1 parameter vector. y it−1 and y i0 are indicators of the firm's rating in the previous year and the initial year respectively, and γ and δ are parameters to be estimated. ϵ it is the disturbance term. Assuming a normally distributed error structure with a zero mean and unit variance, the probability of observing the particular category of rating m reported by firm i at time t is given by:
The estimation of the ordered probit model with state dependence can be performed by maximizing the loglikelihood function using standard numerical techniques.
Since we estimate a model including lagged values, we need to take the problem of initial conditions into account. Thus, we estimate the model allowing for state dependence and accounting for the initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981; Wooldridge, 2005) . We adopt the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2005) for dealing with the problem of initial conditions. This problem is due to the generic feature of the panel that firms (or individuals) inherit different unobserved and time-invariant characteristics that affect the outcomes in every period. The ordered probit models are estimated using maximum likelihood estimators that are available in standard econometric software.
The main advantage of the more general ordered probit model is that it addresses the issue of state dependence explicitly. State dependence provides a causal link between the probability of obtaining a rating in year t, and the realization of the rating in the previous year and the initial state. We expect to find that the fit of the model improves with the introduction of state dependence in the rating, but we can also allow for nonlinearities entering this model, as we have done in earlier models:
We compare these models with a range of alternatives to provide a comparison of models with different dynamic features. These alternatives include a model which only considers the influence of the previous rating on the current rating, and another variant which allows for the influence of the initial rating on the current rating. Both of these models are linked with the work of Bangia et al. (2002) , Behar and Nagpal (1999) and Carty and Fons (1993) . We consider these models both with and without the inclusion of firm characteristics. Another variant which we consider is a model that allows for state dependence but uses the average rating over the previous three years as a determinant of the current rating, instead of the previous rating. This provides us with a range of alternative models of ratings that can be compared both in-and out-of-sample with respect to their predictive abilities.
Comparative predictive ability
The relative performances of ordered probit models of ratings are typically evaluated in terms of an informal goodness of fit indicator, by comparing the predicted and observed ratings in a contingency table. Hence, Amato and Furfine (2004) and Blume et al. (1998) report tables with predicted ratings on the horizontal axis and actual ratings on the vertical axis; they then comment on the numbers of firm-year observations on the diagonal. Pagratis and Stringa (2009) comment on the proportions of predictions that are above, equal to, or below the Moody's actual rating for ratings within some range, e.g. Aaa-Aa2, Aa2-A3, etc. van Gestel et al. (2007) compare the performance based on the number of notches difference between the predicted and actual ratings, irrespective of the direction.
We first report the root mean squared errors (RMSE) of all of the competing models against the baseline model. As a rule, models with smaller errors tend to be superior to other competing models in regard to their predictive ability. However, the difference between two forecasts may not be statistically significantly different from zero. In order to compare forecasts across all competing models, we produce Diebold-Mariano (Diebold & Mariano, 1995) significance levels (hereafter DM). 4 This test should provide us with information as to whether the difference between the forecasts from two competing models is statistically significantly different from zero. In particular, we are able to test whether the errors of the competing models were statistically different to those of the baseline model. The null hypothesis of the equality of the expected forecast performances as a function of their errors, g(e it ), is E[g(e 1t ) − g(e 2t )] = 0. If we define d t = g(e 1t ) − g(e 2t ), where t = 1, 2, . . . , n is the sample mean of the series,d = 1 n ∑ n t=1 d t is the natural basis for comparison in a test. The series d t is autocorrelated, and DM show that the variance of the mean of d t for h-step-ahead forecasts is given by
. Under the null hypothesis, the statistic has an asymptotic standard normal distribution. If the calculated statistic, S, is positive and significant, we can reject the null hypothesis that the errors of the two forecasts are not significantly different.
As well as reporting the values of the DM statistics, we also consider the modified version of this test statistic, which corrects for its tendency to be over-sized, using the adjusted DM test statistic suggested by Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1997) statistics are compared to the critical values of the Student's-t distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom.
In addition to DM and HLN statistics, we use a contingency table of actual and predicted ratings to give a numerical assessment of predictions in-and out-ofsample, in order to compare the alternative models. We denote the proportion of correct predictions by SC , which is the sum of all diagonal terms divided by the total number of observations, SC = 1
to the predicted rating and q t is the actual outcome. We also use the Merton (1981) measure used by Henriksson and Merton (1981) , Chavapatrakul, Kim, and Mizen (2008) and Pesaran and Timmermann (1994) , which modifies the SC measure in order to avoid good predictions from the 'stopped clock' problem. Let CP j be the proportion of correct predictions made byq t when the true state is given by q t = j. From the definition of conditional probability, CP is computed as
and Merton's correct measure, denoted CP, is given by
where J is the number of categories, and − 1 J−1 ≤ CP ≤ 1. In the contingency table, CP is the unweighted average of CP j s minus one (to correct for the stopped clock phenomenon). The CP j s are calculated as the proportion of correct predictions divided by the total of each row. This modifies the measure of predictive ability to discount the influence of the dominant outcome. Only when a predictor is accurate for all categories will it obtain a high CP score.
Data

Data sources
We use Fitch's database as our source of data on issuer default ratings. 5 This database provides information on the long-term ratings assigned to each issuer, as well as the date when the rating became available, and thus we have a continuous rating history for each firm. In keeping with the normal practice in the literature, we categorize our firms into rating categories without considering notches (i.e., + or −). Amato and Furfine (2004) emphasize that this categorization considers large cumulative changes of ratings rather than small movements notch by notch, and avoids the generation of rating categories with very few observations. We consider seven rating categories, ranging from AAA to CCC, which are assigned numerical values, starting with 1 to AAA, 2 to AA, through to 7 to CCC. Following Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) , we group AAA and AA together, creating a 'super-investment grade' category, and we group the CCC and B ratings together similarly. This allows for the fact that there are 5 only a few AAA and CCC ratings. Table 1 reports the ratings distribution of the firms in our sample. We can see that the number of observations increases over time and that our sample is dominated mainly by observations with A and BBB ratings. This information can be used to compare the predicted ratings from the static model with the actual ratings, and the lagged and initial values can be used as inputs to the model with state dependence, before making a similar comparison between the predicted and the actual ratings.
We use Fitch's Peer Analysis Tool to extract firmlevel accounting data. Corporate historical data for all firms rated by Fitch are available from 2000 onwards. Following selection criteria which are commonly used in the literature, we exclude companies which do not have complete records of our explanatory variables, or firmyears with negative sales and profits. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 0.5% upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables.
Our combined sample contains data for 273 firmyears, yielding a total of 1845 annual observations. The firms in our sample operated actively between 2000 and 2007 in a variety of sectors such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and financial services. The panel has an unbalanced structure, with the number of observations on each firm varying between two and eight. Our sample has two characteristics that make it especially appealing for our analysis. First, it includes both investment grade and high yield bonds, where previous studies have mainly restricted their attention to investment grade bonds, neglecting the effects of speculative grade bonds. 6 This is particularly beneficial because firms with high yield bond issues are more likely to be characterized by adverse financial attributes and weak balance sheets, and hence, such firms may be subject to more intensive monitoring. Second, the sample spans a wide range of sectors of the US economy. We use data for five industries: manufacturing, utilities, mining, services and financial services. This classification corresponds to the sectoral breakdown of the entire US economy using the Datastream level 3 sector indices, constructed according to the 1999 FTSE reclassification. Ratings vary based on an industry's fundamentals; industries which are in decline, highly competitive, capital intensive, cyclical or volatile are inherently riskier than stable industries with few competitors, high barriers to entry, national rather than international competition, and predictable demand levels. Therefore, an issuer in a high-risk industry is unlikely to receive the highest rating possible (AAA), despite having a conservative financial profile. We include industry dummies to allow for this feature of the data.
The distribution over the spectrum of ratings AAA-CCC in each year is reported in Table 1 . There is some variation between years, but the proportion of firms in each rating category seems to be quite stable. However, that does not imply that there are no transitions between categories. 2000  2  8  40  72  34  34  4  194  2001  2  7  51  85  40  37  4  226  2002  2  7  55  83  44  33  7  231  2003  2  7  53  83  46  45  7  243  2004  1  7  53  92  48  51  6  258  2005  1  7  54  88  47  46  6  249  2006  1  7  55  86  42  37  4  232  2007  1  7  42  80  42  37  3  212   Observations  12  57  403  669  343  320  41  1845 Notes: The table presents the Notes: The table presents correlations. PROF = Earnings before interest and taxes over total sales; CF = Funds from operations to total assets; LIQ = Cash from operations to total liabilities; COV = Operating profits to interest expenses; LEV = Total debt over total assets; SOLV = Common equity over total assets; and SIZE = Log of real total sales.
Table 3
Correlation matrix for lagged and initial ratings.
AAA-AA_1 A_1 BBB_1 BB_1 B-CC_1 AAA-AA(1) A(1) BBB(1) BB(1) B-CC (1) AAA-AA_1 1.00 A_1 −0.10 
Firm-specific characteristics
Rating agencies use both qualitative and quantitative analyses to assess the business and financial risks of fixedincome issuers (see Fitch, 2006; van Gestel et al., 2007) . In our empirical model we follow both the ratings agencies' practice and the recent literature (e.g. Amato & Furfine, 2004; van Gestel et al., 2007) in measuring these risks using explanatory variables such as profitability, cash flow, liquidity, financial leverage, performance, solvency, and size.
The first two measures are based on earnings. The first is a measure of earnings before interest and taxes over the total sales (PROF), which is a measure of the profitability of the firm, while the second is a measure of the resources the firm is able to generate from its operations relative to its total assets, which is also known as the cash flow (CF). A higher profitability and a greater cash flow improve the credit rating. The liquidity variable (LIQ) indicates the cash from operations relative to liabilities, and also improves the credit rating if it increases. The next two measures indicate the scale of the firm's liabilities, namely the leverage (LEV), defined as total debts over total assets, which indicates the overall indebtedness of the firm, and the interest coverage ratio (COV), as measured by earnings before interest and taxes to interest paid, which assesses the firm's net indebtedness and the cost of debt servicing. A higher leverage implies a weaker balance sheet, and therefore we expect this measure to have an adverse effect on credit ratings, but a higher coverage indicates the opposite. The solvency ratio (SOLV) measures the common equity to total asset ratio. An increase in this variable improves the credit rating. Finally, the real total sales (SIZE) indicates the scale of the firm, and higher values would be expected to improve the rating. To make our results comparable with previous studies, we take threeyear averages. Since this takes into account the previous financial conditions of the firms that are being rated, not just the present conditions, it builds some persistence into the firm-specific characteristics, and should allow our models to replicate some features of credit ratings 'through the cycle'. Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for the firm characteristics and the rating of the firm. It demonstrates that the characteristics have relatively low correlations with each other. In addition, the negative correlation between the credit ratings and profitability, cash flow, liquidity, coverage, solvency and size reflect the tendency for firms to obtain better ratings when they display healthy balance sheets. The positive correlation between credit ratings and leverage shows that highly indebted firms tend to attract worse ratings. This confirms that ratings are correlated with the indicators of creditworthiness on the balance sheet that investors expect ratings to measure. Table 3 provides correlation information for lagged categories of ratings and initial ratings. There is some evidence that lagged and initial ratings in the same category are positively correlated, presumably because there are firms which do not make a transition from their initial rating. This high correlation could potentially result in multicolinearity in the equations where lagged and initial ratings are included together, and therefore, in order to avoid drawing all of our conclusions from models where this could be the case, we compare several different specifications in our results where lagged and initial ratings are included separately. Table 4 reports summary statistics of our explanatory variables. We observe that firms belonging to the investment grade spectrum (BBB and above) have higher profit margins and cash flow values, are more liquid and less leveraged, have higher coverage ratios, are more solvent, and are larger than high yield firms (below BBB).
Results
In this section we report the estimation results.
The linear probit model
The first column of Table 5 reports our baseline model, which we refer to as model 1. Later, we will compare the performances of other models against this baseline. The results show that, with the exception of the measure of leverage, an increase in any of the linear terms in the firmspecific variables improves the credit rating (they have significant negative coefficients which predict a better rating category with a lower number). As profitability, cash flow, interest coverage, liquidity and solvency improve, and as the firm has higher total sales, so the firm receives a better predicted rating, as expected. Leverage has a positive effect, worsening the credit rating, also as we might expect. Model 1 has an R 2 of 0.26.
The non-linear probit model
The results for the nonlinear model (model 2) of van Gestel et al. (2007) are presented in the second column of Notes: The table presents ordered probit estimation results. The left-hand-side variable is the credit rating of a firm. In the analysis, AAA-AA ratings are assigned a '1', A ratings a '2', and so on to the CC ratings, which are assigned a '5'. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA-AA_1, etc. The initial period observations are reported as AAA-AA(1), etc. Time and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Robust zstatistics are reported in parentheses. * Indicates significance at the 10% level. ** Indicates significance at the 5% level. *** Indicates significance at the 1% level. Table 5 . The nonlinear terms apply the hyperbolic tangent transformation to variables to limit the impact of large negative or positive values of the variables on the predicted rating. We first check whether the nonlinear terms are significant by determining whether the coefficients can be restricted to zero. The non-linear transformations of coverage (NLCOV) and liquidity (NLLIQ) reject this hypothesis with a p-value of 0.92 for the joint hypothesis that the coefficients are zero. The nonlinear model has similar signs and significance levels of the linear terms for coverage and liquidity. The nonlinear terms are strongly significant and have negative coefficients, while the linear terms retain their signs and significance. The effect of the nonlinear terms raises the R 2 from 0.26 to 0.27. This indicates that minor improvements in the fit of the model can be achieved with the addition of nonlinear terms, but the predictions of ratings reported later show a greater improvement.
Momentum, ageing and drift
Columns 3-5 in Table 5 indicate the importance of momentum (model 3), ageing (model 4) and drift (model 5), as described earlier in the paper. Carty and Fons (1993) were the first authors to note that a firm's rating depended on whether the firm had previously been upgraded or downgraded. They concluded that firms which had been downgraded were more likely to see subsequent downgrades, while firms which had been upgraded were not more likely to be upgraded. The results in column 3 uphold these findings. The dummy variable indicating that firms have previously been upgraded has a negatively signed coefficient, but one which is not significantly different from zero, while a dummy variable indicating firms which have previously been downgraded has a significant positively signed coefficient. Thus, there seems to be some evidence of momentum along the lines of Carty and Fons (1993) in our sample. There is also evidence of ageing. When we allow for the number of periods in the previous rating state, following a change in the rating state, we find that this variable has a negative and significant coefficient (reported in column 4 of Table 5 ). This means that the rating improves with the length of time in the previous rating state, which confirms the evidence of ageing identified by Carty and Fons (1993) , Kavvathas (2001) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) . Finally, we consider evidence of drift, which can be a result of either variations in the standards of ratings agencies in assigning ratings or variations over time in the credit quality of firms seeking ratings (see Amato & Furfine, 2004; Blume et al., 1998; Cantor & Mann, 2003) . We report the coefficient on the difference between the percentage of firms experiencing an upgrade and the percentage of firms experiencing a downgrade in each calendar year. We find that the estimated coefficients are significant for all but 2002, and all significant variables are positive and increasing in magnitude, implying that there is a tendency for ratings to worsen over time. This supports the findings of Blume et al. (1998) , but it is not clear whether this is due to stricter ratings by agencies, or a deterioration in the credit quality of the firms being rated. Despite the strong evidence in favor of momentum, ageing and drift, we find that it adds almost nothing to the goodness-of-fit of these rating probit models. Bangia et al. (2002) , Behar and Nagpal (1999) , Kavvathas (2001) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) note that the rating transition depends on the previous rating category. We now introduce initial and lagged values of the rating for each firm in order to allow for state dependence and initial conditions in the results reported in Table 6 . In columns one and two (models 6 and 7) we report the results of the probit model when we allow for lagged and initial ratings separately and without other variables present, then in column three we report the impact of including both lagged and initial ratings in the model, with no other variables in the equation (model 8). Then, in columns 4-6, we report the impact of including firm-specific variables (models 9-11). Finally, we report the results of a model where we allow for the average rating over the past three years, instead of the rating in the previous period (model 12) . This provides a range of results which allows us to determine the relative importance of lagged and initial rating data, providing evidence of a certain type of momentum in models of ratings. All of the models include some element of state dependence, and it remains to be seen whether these models improve on the predictions of the models in Table 5 .
Allowing for state dependence in ratings
The findings in these columns show that the previous or initial ratings are significant predictors of the current rating in nearly every case. A positive and significant coefficient on the lagged rating (relative to the baseline rating of A) means that firms with this rating in the previous period are predicted to have a rating with a higher ordinal value than A this period. (Recall that higher ordinal values are associated with lower ratings.) The opposite is true for negative coefficients. Thus, firms with AAA-AA ratings in the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings above A, and firms with BBB ratings or below in the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings below A. Because the numbers for firms with AAA-AA ratings are larger negative numbers than those with A ratings, they will have correspondingly lower predicted ratings, i.e. ratings which are higher on the rating scale.
We compare these models with two models that allow for state dependence in the ratings, one based on first lagged and initial ratings and an average of lagged ratings over the previous three years, and the other on the initial rating. The estimates are similar to those reported in the previous columns in the following respects. We observe that both linear and nonlinear variables retain their signs and significance in most cases. The variables are not as strongly significant as they were in the other models, which suggests that some of their significance in the previous model was a result of state dependence in the ratings, which is now measured by the lagged and initial ratings directly. Nevertheless, the linear and nonlinear terms do not lose all of their significance in every case, and we retain these variables in our model. We also find that the lagged dependent variables -included in order to test formally for state dependence -are highly statistically significant. We therefore conclude that the previous state matters for the prediction of the rating today, and if a firm was rated below investment grade at time t − 1, it is predicted to remain in the high-yield spectrum in the current period; similarly, being rated as investment grade in the previous period increases the probability of being rated as an investment grade issuer in the current year. As we will see later, this prediction is almost always correct. When we consider the effect of the average rating in periods t −1, t −2 and t −3 in place of the lagged rating, we find a similar result.
The coefficients of the lagged and average ratings show a similar gradient in the magnitude of the coefficient as one moves from a previous rating status of CC to AAA-AA. Embedding this state dependence through the previous rating or the average rating of the three previous years substantially improves the fit of the model. Thus, firms with AAA-AA ratings in the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings above A, and firms with BBB ratings or below in the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings below A. The estimated coefficients for the initial period observations are also highly significant. They show characteristics which are similar to the previous period rating for firms with initial ratings above A, since the coefficients are negative, and are larger negative numbers as the initial rating improves. Below A, firms with BB and B-CC initial ratings have worse predicted ratings than those with initial A ratings, while BBB rated firms appear to have better predicted ratings. Models with state dependence have higher R 2 values than models without state dependence, but we now compare the predictive performances in-and out-of-sample using root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano statistics and in contingency tables.
Predictions
In-sample predictions
We begin by evaluating the forecasts of the models presented in Table 5 . In columns one to three of Table 7 , we report root mean squared errors (RMSE) and values for the Diebold-Mariano and Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold statistics, compared to those of the baseline model (model 1) in Table 5 . The results suggest that model 3 has the smallest RMSEs, and there is evidence of a statistically significant difference between model 1, which is the baseline model, and models 2, 3, 4 and 5. According to the DM and HLN tests, only models 2 and 3 have a predictive ability superior to that of the linear baseline model. In columns one to three of Table 8 we give the RMSEs and values of the DM and HLN statistics for the models presented in Table 6 . On the basis of the above mentioned statistics, there is a significant difference between the performances of the baseline model and all other models. Thus, all of the models reported in Table 6 (except model 6) perform better than the baseline model. The model with state dependence (model 11) displays the smallest RMSE, and is significantly superior to the baseline model.
For the model with the smallest RMSE (model 11, with state dependence, as shown in Table 6 ), we present a contingency table where one can compare the predicted and actual ratings. The outcome of this exercise is shown in Table 9 . Reading across each row gives the number to 1995 had scores of SC = 0.57 and CP = 0.30, while Amato and Furfine (2004) had similar scores of SC = 0.52 and CP = 0.26 for the model of bond issuing forms for data from 1984 to 2001 with time dummies included. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is that credit ratings are indeed highly autocorrelated, and previous years' ratings are a key variable when predicting current ratings in-sample.
Out-of-sample predictions
This section presents out-of-sample predictions of ratings using the past and current information available up to time T . We use an expanding window method, which allows the successive observations to be included in the initial sample prior to producing the next one-step-ahead prediction of the rating, while keeping the start date of the sample fixed. By this method, we forecast future ratingŝ q t+1 ,q t+2 , etc. The initial estimation window is [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] and the first prediction date is the year 2005. We then increase T by one each time, until T reaches the year 2007. Columns 4-6 of Table 7 report the RMSEs and DM and HLN statistic values for the models in Table 5 . We are able to reject the null hypothesis of equal forecasting performance for all four models. Specifically, models 2 and 3 are significantly better than the baseline model in terms of forecasting ratings. Table 8 reports the relative performance using the RMSE, DM and HLN statistics to compare the models in Table 6 with the baseline model. We identify evidence of a significant difference between the baseline model and the competing models in five cases out of seven. Once again, the model with state dependence (model 11) displays the highest DM statistic value and the lowest RMSE. 7 Table 10 provides the contingency table of the predicted versus actual outcome out-of-sample results for the model with state dependence. As with the in-sample results, the predictive ability of the out-of-sample predictions is upheld when lagged values of the ratings and initial ratings are included, since SC = 0.94 and the Merton correct prediction statistic indicates CP = 0.93. The prediction out-of-sample is remarkably good, and shows that state dependence is a feature of ratings that helps in forecasting.
Conclusion
Many models of the relationship between credit ratings and a firm's financial characteristics have used a linear probit model. In this paper we introduce nonlinear terms and allow the ratings to vary due to ageing, momentum and drift. We then introduce state dependence in the form of lagged and initial ratings. The resulting model shows that non-linearities and state dependence terms improve the fit of a model seeking to determine a firm's 7 We have also compared the model with state dependence with all other competing models. According to both the DM and HLN statistics, the model with state dependence is significantly better in terms of forecasting ratings.
credit rating. When we analyze the ability of such a model to predict ratings, we find that the model with nonlinearities and state dependence predicts much better than the baseline linear probit model both in-sample and outof-sample. It appears that allowing for state dependence offers greater gains than allowing for non-linearities alone (although these offer some improvement in prediction), offering an SC score that is correct 98% of the time, and a CP score which is correct 97% of the time. The statedependent model has the best performance, as evaluated by the Diebold-Mariano statistic. When we compare the performance of the model with state dependence out-ofsample, we find that its performance does not deteriorate very much. It is correct 94% of the time on a SC basis, and 93% of the time on a CP basis out-of-sample, allowing for predictions one year ahead for the years 2005-2007; once again, this model is superior according to the Diebold-Mariano statistic. We conclude that the use of information on the initial condition of the rating of the firm and the last observation of its actual rating helps the model to predict the rating correctly more often than a model which excludes this information.
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